Optimal Retirement Tontines for the 21st Century: With Reference to
  Mortality Derivatives in 1693 by Milevsky, Moshe A. & Salisbury, Thomas S.
OPTIMAL RETIREMENT TONTINES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
WITH REFERENCE TO MORTALITY DERIVATIVES IN 1693
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Abstract. Historical tontines promised enormous rewards to the last survivors at the
expense of those who died early. And, while this design appealed to the gambling instinct, it is
a suboptimal way to manage longevity risk during retirement. This is why fair life annuities
making constant payments – where the insurance company is exposed to the longevity risk
– induces greater lifetime utility. However, tontines do not have to be designed using a
winner-take-all approach and insurance companies do not actually sell fair life annuities,
partially due to aggregate longevity risk.
In this paper we derive the tontine structure that maximizes lifetime utility, but doesn’t
expose the sponsor to any longevity risk. Technically speaking we solve the Euler Lagrange
equation and examine its sensitivity to (i.) the size of the tontine pool, (ii.) individual
longevity risk aversion, and (iii.) subjective health status. The optimal tontine varies
with the individual’s longevity risk aversion γ and the number of participants n, which is
problematic for product design. That said, we introduce a structure called a natural tontine
whose payout declines in exact proportion to the (expected) survival probabilities, which is
near-optimal for all γ and n. We compare the utility of optimal tontines to the utility of
loaded life annuities under reasonable demographic and economic conditions and find that
the life annuity’s advantage over tontines, is minimal.
We also use our framework to review and analyze the first-ever mortality-derivative issued
by the British government, known as King Williams’s tontine of 1693. Although it is widely
acknowledged that mortality-derivatives were mis-priced in their early years, it is worth
noting that both life annuities and tontines co-existed during that period. We shed light
on the preferences and beliefs of those who invested in the tontines vs. the annuities and
conclude by arguing that tontines should be re-introduced and allowed to co-exist with life
annuities. Individuals would likely select a portfolio of tontines and annuities that suit their
personal preferences for consumption and longevity risk, as they did over 320 years ago.
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“...Upon the same revenue more money can always be raised by tontines than
by annuities for separate lives. An annuity, with a right of survivorship, is
really worth more than an equal annuity for a separate life, and from the con-
fidence which every man naturally has in his own good fortune, the principle
upon which is founded the success of all lotteries, such an annuity generally
sells for something more than it is worth. In countries where it is usual for
government to raise money by granting annuities, tontines are upon this ac-
count generally preferred to annuities for separate lives...”
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776
1. Introduction and Executive Summary
As policymakers, academics and the public at large grow increasingly concerned about
the cost of an aging society, we believe it is worthwhile to go back in time and examine the
capital market instruments used to finance retirement in a period before social insurance,
defined benefit (DB) pensions and annuity companies. Indeed, in the latter part of the
17th century and for almost two centuries afterwards, one of the most popular retirement
investments in the developed world was not a stock, bond or a mutual fund – although they
were available. In fact, the preferred method used by many individuals to generate income
in the senior years of the lifecycle was a so-called tontine scheme sponsored by government1.
Part annuity, part lottery and part hedge fund, the tontine – which recently celebrated its
360th birthday – offered a lifetime of income that increased as other members of the tontine
pool died off and their money was distributed to survivors.
The underlying and original tontine scheme is quite distinct from its public image as a
lottery for centenarians in which the longest survivor wins all the money in a pool. In fact, the
tontine annuity – as it is sometimes called – is more subtle and much more elegant. Imagine
a group of 1000 soon-to-be retirees who band together and pool $1,000 each to purchase
a million-dollar U.S. Treasury bond paying 3% coupons. The bond generates $30,000 in
interest yearly, which is split among the 1000 participants in the pool, for a 30,000 / 1,000
= guaranteed $30 dividend per member. A custodian holds the big bond – taking no risk
and requiring no capital – and charges a trivial fee to administer the annual dividends. So
far this structure is the basis for all bond funds. Nothing new. But, in a tontine scheme the
members agree that if-and-when they die, their guaranteed $30 dividend is split amongst
those who still happen to be alive.
For example, if one decade later only 800 original investors are alive, the $30,000 coupon
is divided into 800, for a $37.50 dividend each. Of this, $30 is the guaranteed dividend
and $7.50 is other people’s money Then, if two decades later only 100 survive, the annual
cash flow to survivors is $300, which is a $30 guaranteed dividend plus $280. When only
1Sources: Weir (1989), Poterba (2005) and McKeever (2009)
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30 remain, they each receive $1,000 in dividends, which mind you, is a 100% yield in that
year alone. The extra payments – above and beyond the guaranteed $30 dividend – are the
mortality credits. In fact, under this scheme payments are expected to increase at the rate
of mortality, which is a type of super-inflation hedge.
The tontine, of course, differs from a conventional life annuity. Although both offer income
for life and pool longevity risk, the mechanics and therefore the cost to the investor are quite
different. The annuity promises predictable guaranteed lifetime payments, but this comes at
a cost – and regulator-imposed capital requirements – that inevitably makes its way to the
annuitant. Indeed, the actuaries make very conservative assumptions regarding how long
annuitants are likely to live, and then spend the next five decades worrying whether they got
it right. In contrast, the tontine custodian divides the variable X (bond coupons received)
by the variable Y (participants alive) and sends out checks2. It’s cleaner to administer, less
capital-intensive and – in its traditional form – results in an increasing payment stream over
time (assuming you are alive of course).
In this paper we make the argument that properly designed tontines should be on the
menu of products available to individuals as they transition into their retirement years.
1.1. History vs. The Future. Lorenzo Tonti was a colorful Italian banker who in the 1650s
invented and promoted the scheme which shares his name. He described it as a mixture of
lottery and insurance equally driven by old-age fear and economic greed. They were first
introduced in Holland, then very successfully in France3 and a few decades later, in 1693,
England’s King William of Orange presided over the first government-issued tontine. The
goal was to raise a million pounds to help finance his war against France. For a minimum
payment of £100, participants were given the option of (a) investing in a tontine scheme
paying guaranteed £10 dividends until the year 1700 and then £7 thereafter, or (b) a life
annuity paying £14 for life, but with no survivorship benefits. This choice – between two
possible ways of financing retirement – is quite fascinating and the intellectual impetus for
this paper.
Over a thousand Englishmen (but very few woman) decided to invest in the tontine. The
sums involved weren’t trivial. The £100 entry fee would be worth at least $100,000 today4.
So, this was no impulse lottery purchase. Rather, some investors picked the tontine because
they wanted the skewness – that is potential for a very large payout if they survived – while
others wanted the more predictable annuity income option. The oldest survivor of King
2In between the tontine and the annuity lies the participating annuity which shares some longevity risk
within a pool using a long-term smoothing scheme. Unfortunately, the actual formula for determining the
smoothing mechanism is anything but smooth and has little basis in economics. That said, self annuitization
schemes (GSA), proposed by Piggott, Valdez and Detzel (2005) have been growing in academic popularity.
3Source: Jennings and Trout (1982)
4Source: Lewin (2003)
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William’s tontine of 1693 lived to age 100, earning £1,000 in her final year – and no doubt
well tended to by her family5. More on this intriguing episode, later.
Some might view this entire exercise as a mere historical and intellectual curiosity. After
all, tontines are (effectively) illegal in the U.S. and certainly have a nasty taint associated
with them. However, we believe that there are some deep and subtle lessons that one can
learn about the design of retirement income products in the 21st century, from this episode
in financial history. Indeed, the choice between a tontine in which longevity risk is pooled
and a life annuity in which payments are guaranteed is a euphemism for many of the choices
retirees, and society, now face.
Once again, our main practical points will be that (i) tontines and life annuities have co-
existed in the past, so perhaps they can in the future; (ii) there really is no reason to construct
the tontine payout function such that the last survivor receives hundreds of multiples times
their initial investment; and (iii) a properly constructed tontine can result in lifetime utility
that is comparable to the utility of a life annuity.
1.2. Outline of the Paper. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section (2) describes the first English tontine of 1693 in great detail, which is one of
the earliest opportunities to examine the real-life choice between tontines and life annuities.
Section (3) is the theoretical core of the paper, which derives the properties of the optimal
tontine structure and compares it with the life annuity. Section (4) uses and applies the
results from section (3) and addresses how 21st century tontines might be constructed. In
section (5) we briefly survey the existing literature which wasn’t directly referenced in earlier
sections of the paper. Finally, section (6) concludes the paper and section (7) is an appendix
which contains all non-essential proofs and derivations.
2. King William’s Tontine of 1693
On November 4th, 1692, during the fourth year of the reign of King William and Queen
Mary, the British Parliament passed the so-called Million Act, which was a rather desperate
attempt to raise one million pounds towards carrying on the war against France. The
Million Act specified that any British native or foreigner – except for French citizens, one
might suppose – could purchase a tontine share from the exchequer for £100, prior to May
1st, 1693 and thus gain entry into the first British government tontine scheme.
For £100 an investor could select any nominee of any age – including the investor himself –
on whose life the tontine would be contingent. Dividend payments would be distributed to
the investor as long as the nominee was still alive. Now, to put the magnitude of the minimal
£100 investment in perspective, the average annual wage of building laborers in England
during the latter part of the 17th century was approximately £16 and a few shillings per
5Source: Finlaison (1829)
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year6. So the entry investment in the tontine pool far exceeded the average industrial wage
and the annual dividends alone might serve as a decent pension for a common laborer. It is
therefore quite plausible to argue that the 1693 tontine was an investment for the rich and
perhaps even one of the first exclusive hedge funds.
This was a simpler structure compared to the original tontine scheme envisioned by
Lorenzo de Tonti in the year 1653, which involved multiple classes and different dividend
rates. In the 1693 English tontine, each share of £100 would entitle the investor to an an-
nual dividend of £10 for seven years (until June 1700), after which the dividends would be
reduced to £7 per share. The 10% and 7% tontine dividend rate exceeded prevailing (risk
free) interest rates in England at the end of the 17th century, which were officially capped
at 6%7. Note the declining structure of the interest payments, which is a preview of our
soon-to-come discussion about the optimal tontine payout function.
Interestingly, nowhere within the Statutes of the Realm, which reproduces the Million Act
verbatim, was the word tontine actually mentioned and neither was Lorenzo de Tonti ever
referenced. Rather, the act stated innocuously: And so, from time to time upon the death
of every nominee, whatsoever share of dividend was payable during the life of such nominee
shall be equally divided amongst the rest of the contributors8.
Although the monarch’s plan was to use the money to fund an expensive war, the same
act also introduced a new excise tax on beer, ale and other liquors for a period of 99 years.
The rates included nine pence for every brewed barrel of ale, six pence for every gallon of
brandy and three pence for every hogshead of cider. The intent was to use this tax to cover
the dividends on the tontine scheme. This is a very early example of securitization, or an
attempt to borrow against future tax revenues.
Moving on to the annuity side of the offering, to further entice investors to participate in
the tontine scheme, the act included a unique sweetener or bonus provision. It stipulated
that if the entire £1,000,000 target wasn’t subscribed by May 1693 – thus reducing the size
of the lottery payoff for the final survivor – the investors who had enrolled in the tontine
during the six month subscription period (starting in November 1692) would have the option
of converting their £100 tontine shares into a life annuity paying £14 per year. Under this
alternative, the 14% dividend payments were structured as a conventional life annuity with
no group survivorship benefits or tontine features. Think of a single premium life annuity.
This option-to-convert is quite intriguing and worthy of further analysis.
Why this extra option was added to the Million Act is unclear. Perhaps the fear amongst
the tontine administrators – and reluctance expressed by potential investors – was that
otherwise few people would subscribe. Indeed, part of what entices speculators to join a
6Source: Lewin (2003)
7Source: Homer and Sylla (2005)
8British History Online, An Act for Granting to Their Majesties certain Rates and Duties of Excise upon
Beer, Ale and other Liquors, William and Mary 1692. www.british-history.ac.uk
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tontine is the large potential payout, which accrues to the last survivor. One requires more
participants for a bigger jackpot, but participants aren’t likely to join unless the jackpot
is big enough to begin with. So, the option-to-convert was likely added to give investors a
possible exit strategy if they were disappointed with the number of subscribers. Naturally,
an investor can’t just cash-out of a tontine pool and walk away with original capital once it
is up and running.
Alas, the funds raised by early May 1963 fell far short of the million pound target. Accord-
ing to records maintained by the Office of the Exchequer, stored within the Archives of the
British Library9, a total of only £377,000 was subscribed and approximately 3,750 people
were nominated10 to the tontine during the period between November 1692 and May 1693.
This then triggered the option-to-exchange the tontine into a 14% life annuity, because,
obviously, the £1,000,000 target wasn’t reached.
Interestingly, it seems that a total of 1,013 nominees (representing 1081 tontine shares)
remained in the original 10%/7% tontine, while the other third elected to convert their
tontine shares into a 14% life annuity contingent on the same nominee. The following table
1 and table 2 provide a summary of the number of nominees who stayed in the tontine as
well as the number of shares they purchased.
Table 1 and Table 2 here
In fact, the government passed another act in June 1693, to make the 14% life annuities
available to anyone in a desperate attempt to reach their funding target. They still couldn’t
raise a million pounds. Remember, interest rates at the time were 6%, and there were
absolutely no restrictions placed on the nominee’s age for either the tontine or the annuity.
At first glance, it is rather puzzling why anyone would stay in the tontine pool instead of
switching to the life annuity. On a present value basis, a cash flow of £10 for 7 years and
£7 thereafter, is much less valuable compared to £14 for life. As we shall describe later, the
actuarial present value of the 10%/7% combination at the 6% official interest rate was worth
approximately £133 at the (typical nominee) age of ten, whereas the value of the life annuity
was worth almost £185. Remember, the original investment was £100. It is no surprise that
the British government was really losing money on these 14% annuities11. And, they were
offering these terms to anyone regardless of how young they were. Why did anyone stay in
the tontine pool?
It’s not just 21st century financial logic that dictates that a 14% life annuity would have
been a good (and better) deal. In fact, none other than the astronomer Edmond Halley,
writing in the January 1693 edition of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
just a few months after the passage of the Million Act opined on the matter. He wrote that:
9Source: Howard, (1694)
10Note that one nominee could have multiple shares of £100 contingent on their life.
11Source: Finlaison (1829)
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This shows the great advantage of putting money into the present fund granted
to their majesties, giving 14% per annum, of at the rate of 7 years purchase
for a life, when [even] the young lives at the annual [6%] rate of interest, are
worth above 13 years purchase.
The phrase years purchase is an early actuarial term for the number of years before one
gets one’s entire money back. It’s another way of quoting a price. For example, if you receive
£5 per year for life, it takes 20 years to get your £100 back (ignoring interest), so this would
be called 20 years purchase.
A major research question then, is: Why did a full third of the subscribers decide to stay
in the tontine pool, while two thirds switched to the life annuity? It’s hard to argue that
the remaining tontine investors were irrational, ignorant or perhaps taking the lottery ticket
approach, while the life annuity investors took the better financial terms. After all, the
£100 was a very large sum of money in 1693. Could differing views on mortality and/or
risk aversion explain why some investors switched, while others didn’t? Can one provide a
rational explanation for this seemingly irrational choice? The framework we introduced in
section (3) might help shed light on this decision, or at least rationalize the choice.
Note that although very careful records must have been kept for the purpose of adminis-
trating the tontine pool, today we only have access to (i.) a list of every single person who
participated in the 1693 tontine, as well as the age of their nominees, (ii.) their status in
the year 1730, and (iii.) their status in 1749. These are the three primary documents at our
disposal.
As mentioned in the introduction, the longest living nominee of the 1693 tontine – who
was a mere 10 years of age at the time of initial nomination – lived to the age of 100,
surviving for 90 more years to the year 1783. She was a female who spent her senior years
in Wimbledon and earned a dividend of £1,081 in her last year of life12. Although her
payout was capped once seven survivors remained in the tontine pool, her final payment was
ten times the original investment of £100. Remember, this was only one year’s worth of
dividends! Note that had she switched over to the life annuity – likely it was her father who
made the decisions and nominated her, since she was only 10 years old at the time – back
in 1693 and then lived to 1783, her dividend would have been a mere £14.
Figure 1 and 2 here
The six month period in between the announcement of the Million Act tontine scheme in
November 1692 and the date at which the final list was closed in late May and early June
1693 was quite busy and interesting. The London-based promoters of the tontine – perhaps
expecting some sort of commission – published a table in late 1692 purporting to show a
low expected number of survivors and a correspondingly high dividend payout rate over the
next 100 years. These initial projections were probably viewed as unattractive because the
12Source: Finlaison (1829).
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subscription rate was much, much lower than the 10,000 target. A few months later, in early
1693, the promoters published a follow-up table showing an even lower mortality rate for the
group and a correspondingly higher projected dividend payout rate for survivors13. These
two sets of tables, together with the actual experience of the 1013 nominees who remained
in the tontine, are displayed graphically in Figure 1 and 2. Note how the actual survival rate
far exceeded the initial projections, which might have been based on population morality
vs. the much healthier (anti-selected) nominee group. There is also some speculation that
Edmond Halley, who coincidently presented the first known life table and annuity pricing
model to the Royal Society in March 1693, was involved in the creation of the mortality
tables underlying the investment projections. In fact, Edmond Halley and his life table are
repeatedly referred to by participants in the tontine who subsequently complained about the
low mortality rates and even made accusations of fraud. But, other than the coincidental
timing, there is no evidence Halley participated in the tontine scheme or it’s promotion14.
Table 3 here
Table 3 displays the distribution of the ages of the nominees when the list closed in the
summer of 1693. Recall that these are the 1013 nominees who did not switch over to the
annuity paying 14%. They remained in the tontine pool earning 10% for seven years and 7%
thereafter. Notice the age distribution in 1693 and the fact that so many nominees were in
their 20s, 30s, 40s and even one in their 50s. Table 3 also displays the survival status of this
group in 1730 and 1749, which are the only two dates at which detailed documentation and
a list of the nominees is available15.
In the next section we present an economic theory to describe and understand who might
elect to participate in a tontine and who might choose a life annuity, as well as the properties
of a tontine that are likely to generate the highest lifetime utility. To pre-empt the result,
we will show that although the life annuity clearly dominated the tontine in terms of lifetime
utility, a declining tontine payout structure is in fact optimal. Furthermore, it is possible
that an investor who believes their nominee is much healthier than the remainder of the
tontine pool may favour the tontine over the annuity.
3. Tontine vs. Annuity: Economic Theory
We assume an objective survival function tpx, for an individual aged x to survive t years.
The implications of subjective vs. objective survival rates will be addressed later. We assume
that the tontine pays out continuously, as opposed to quarterly or monthly, although this
doesn’t really change the economics of the matter. The basic annuity involves annuitants
(who are also the nominees) each paying $1 to the insurer initially, and receiving in return an
13Source: Lewin (2003)
14Source: Walford (1871)
15Source: Leeson (1968)
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income stream of c(t) dt for life. The constraint on annuities is that they are fairly priced, in
other words that with a sufficiently large client base, the initial payments invested at the risk-
free rate will fund the called-for payments in perpetuity. Later we discuss the implications
of insurance loadings. Either way, there is a constraint on the annuity payout function c(t),
namely that
(1)
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx c(t) dt = 1.
Though c(t) is the payout rate per survivor, the payout rate per initial dollar invested is
tpx c(t). We will return to this later.
Letting u(c) denote the instantaneous utility of consumption (a.k.a. felicity function), a
rational annuitant (with lifetime ζ) having no bequest motives will choose a life annuity
payout function for which c(t) maximizes the discounted lifetime utility:
(2) E[
∫ ζ
0
e−rtu(c(t)) dt] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx u(c(t)) dt
where r is (also) the subjective discount rate (SDR), all subject to the constraint (1).
By the Euler-Lagrange theorem16, this implies the existence of a constant λ such that
(3) e−rttpx u′(c(t)) = λe−rttpx for every t.
In other words, u′(c(t)) = λ is constant, so provided that utility function u(c) is strictly
concave, the optimal annuity payout function c(t) is also constant. That constant is now
determined by (1), showing the following:
Theorem 4. Optimized life annuities have constant c(t) ≡ c0, where
c0 =
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx dt
]−1
.
This result can be traced-back to Yaari (1965) who showed that the optimal (retirement)
consumption profile is constant (flat) and that 100% of wealth is annualized when there is no
bequest motive. For more details and an alternate proof, see the excellent book by Cannon
and Tonks (2008) and specifically the discussion on annuity demand theory in chapter 7.
3.1. Optimal Tontine Payout. In practice of course, insurance companies who are paying
the life annuity c(t) are exposed to both longevity risk, which is the uncertainty in tpx, as
well as re-investment or interest rate risk, which is the uncertainty in r over long horizons.
The former is our concern here, so we will continue to assume that r is a given constant for
most of what follows. Note that even if re-investment rates were known with certainty, the
insurance company would likely payout less than the c(t) implied by equation (1) as a result
16Source: Elsgolc (2007) page #51 or Gelfand and Fomin (2000), page #15
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of required capital and reserves, effectively lowering the lifetime utility of the (annuity and
the) retiree.
This brings us to the tontine structures we will consider as an alternative, in which a
predetermined dollar amount is shared among survivors at every t. Let d(t) be the rate
funds are paid out per initial dollar invested, a.k.a. the tontine payout function. Our main
point (in this paper) is that there is no reason for tontine payout function to be a constant
fixed percentage of the initial dollar invested (e.g. 4% or 7%), as it was historically. In
fact, we can pose the same question as considered above for annuities: what d(t) is optimal
for subscribers, subject to the constraint that sponsor of the tontine cannot sustain a loss?
Note that the natural comparison is now between d(t) and tpx c(t), where c(t) is the optimal
annuity payout found above.
Suppose there are initially n subscribers to the tontine scheme, each depositing a dollar
with the tontine sponsor. Let N(t) be the random number of live subscribers at time t.
Consider one of these subscribers. Given that this individual is alive, N(t) − 1 ∼ Bin(n −
1, tpx). In other words, the number of other (alive) subscribers at anytime t is Binomially
distributed with probability parameter tpx.
So, as we found for the life annuity, this individual’s discounted lifetime utility is
E[
∫ ζ
0
e−rtu
(nd(t)
N(t)
)
dt] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxE[u
(nd(t)
N(t)
)
| ζ > t] dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
tp
k
x(1− tpx)n−1−ku
(nd(t)
k + 1
)
dt.
The constraint on the tontine payout function d(t) is that the initial deposit of n should be
sufficient to sustain withdrawals in perpetuity. Of course, at some point all subscribers will
have died, so in fact the tontine sponsor will eventually be able to cease making payments,
leaving a small windfall left over. But this time is not predetermined, so we treat that profit
as an unavoidable feature of the tontine. Remember that we do not want to expose the
sponsor to any longevity risk. It is the pool that bears this risk entirely.
Our budget or pricing constraint is therefore that
(5)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t) dt = 1.
So, for example, if d(t) = d0 is forced to be constant (the historical structure, which we
call a flat tontine), then the tontine payout function (rate) is simply d0 = r, or slightly more
if the upper bound of integration in (5) is less than infinity. We are instead searching for
the optimal d(t) which is far from constant.
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By the Euler-Lagrange theorem from the Calculus of Variations, there is a constant λ such
that the optimal d(t) satisfies
(6) e−rttpx
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
tp
k
x(1− tpx)n−1−k
n
k + 1
u′
(nd(t)
k + 1
)
= λe−rt
for every t. Note that this expression directly links individual utility u(c) to the optimal
participating annuity. Recall that a tontine is an extreme case of participation or pooling
of all longevity risk. Equation (6) dictates exactly how a risk averse retiree will tradeoff
consumption against longevity risk. In other words, we are not advocating some ad-hoc
actuarial process for smoothing realized mortality experience.
Note that an actual mortality hazard rate µx does not appear in the above equation – it
appears only implicitly, in both tpx and λ (which is determined by (5)). Therefore, we will
simplify our notation by re-parametrizing in terms of the probability: Let Du(p) satisfy
(7) p
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k n
k + 1
u′
(nDu(p)
k + 1
)
= λ.
Substituting p = 1 into the above equation, it collapses to u′(Du(1)) = λ.
Theorem 8. Optimal tontine structure is d(t) = Du(tpx), where λ is chosen so (5) holds.
We can simplify this in the case of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility. Let
u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ) if γ 6= 1, and when γ = 1 take u(c) = log c instead. Define
(9) θn,γ(p) = E
[( n
N(p)
)1−γ]
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k
( n
k + 1
)1−γ
where N(p)− 1 ∼ Bin(n− 1, p). Set βn,γ(p) = pθn,γ(p). Then
Corollary 10. With CRRA utility, the optimal tontine has withdrawal rate DOTn,γ (p) =
DOTn,γ (1)βn,γ(p)
1/γ, where
(11) DOTn,γ (1) =
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtβn,γ(tpx)1/γ dt
]−1
.
Proof. Suppose γ 6= 1. Then the equation for DOTn,γ (p) becomes that
(12) DOTn,γ (p)
−γpθn,γ(p) = λ = DOTn,γ (1)
−γ.
The constraint (5) now implies (11). A similar argument applies when γ = 1. 
DOTn,γ (p)/D
OT
n,γ (1) = βn,γ(p)
1/γ does not depend on the particular form of the mortality
hazard rate µx, or on the interest rate r, but only on longevity risk aversion γ and the
number of initial subscribers to the tontine pool, n. In other words, the mortality hazard
rate and r enter into the expression for DOTn,γ (p) only via the constant D
OT
n,γ (1).
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To our knowledge, we are the first to derive the properties of an optimal tontine payout
function, in contrast to the optimal life annuity which is well-known in the literature. Let us
now compare the two. In other words, we compare the payout per initial subscriber for both
products. Equivalently, we can compare the actual payout of the optimal tontine to what
we call a natural tontine, in which the payout is d(t) = DN(tpx) where DN(p) is proportional
to p, just as is the case for the annuity payment per initial dollar invested. Comparing the
budget constraints (1) and (5), we see that DN(p) = pc0. As we will soon see, the natural
tontine is optimal for logarithmic utility (γ = 1) and is close to optimal when n is large. So
we propose this as a reasonable structure for designing tontine products in practice.
Figure 7 shows the ratio of DOTn,γ (p) to DN(p), with Gompertz hazard rate λ(t) =
1
b
e
x+t−m
b .
This can be carried out for any specific hazard rate, but to get a universal result, we again
re-parametrize in terms of p, and scale out constants. In other words, we consider the ratio
(13) Rn,γ(p) =
DOTn,γ (p)/D
OT
n,γ (1)
DN(p)/DN(1)
=
[
p1−γθn,γ(p)
]1/γ
=
βn,γ(p)
1/γ
p
.
This has Rn,γ(1) = 1 and depends only on p, γ, and n, not the specific mortality model.
By the law of large numbers, it is clear that limn→∞Rn,γ(p) = 1 for any fixed γ and p. In
general, we have the following:
Theorem 14. For any n and 0 < p < 1,
Rn,γ(p) is

< 1, 0 < γ < 1
= 1, γ = 1
> 1, 1 < γ.
Since Rn,γ(p) =
(
βn,γ(p)/p
γ
)1/γ
, the theorem follows immediately from the following
estimate, which is proved in the appendix 7.1.
Lemma 15. For any n and 0 < p < 1,
βn,γ(p) is

< pγ, 0 < γ < 1
= pγ, γ = 1
> pγ, 1 < γ.
Since low p corresponds to advanced age, and p = 1 corresponds to the date of purchase,
Theorem 14 implies that individuals who are more longevity risk-averse than logarithmic (ie.
γ > 1) prefer to enhance the natural tontine payout at advanced ages, at the expense of the
initial payout. Whereas individuals less longevity risk-averse than logarithmic (ie 0 < γ < 1)
prefer to enhance initial payouts at the expense of those at advanced ages.
Observe that the case γ = 1 of the Theorem implies the assertion made earlier, that the
natural tontine is optimal when γ = 1, The argument is simple in this case. For u(c) = log(c),
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the Euler-Lagrange equations are simply that d(t) = λ · tpx, which implies that DOTn,1 (p) is
proportional to p. Therefore DOTn,1 (p) = DN(p) and so Rn,1(p) = 1 for every p.
In section (4) we will provide a variety of numerical examples that illustrate the optimal
tontine payout function d(t) as a function of longevity risk aversion γ and the initial size of
the tontine pool n.
3.2. Optimal Tontine Utility vs. Annuity Utility. Let UOTn,γ denote the utility of the
optimal tontine. To compute this, suppose γ 6= 1, and observe that
(16)
DOTn,γ (p)
1−γ
1− γ pθn,γ(p) =
DOTn,γ (p)
1− γ D
OT
n,γ (p)
−γpθn,γ(p) =
DOTn,γ (p)
1− γ D
OT
n,γ (1)
−γ
by (12). The utility of the optimal tontine is therefore precisely
UOTn,γ =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
DOTn,γ (tpx)
1−γ
1− γ tpx θn,γ(tpx) dt =
DOTn,γ (1)
−γ
1− γ
∫ ∞
0
e−rtDOTn,γ (tpx) dt
=
DOTn,γ (1)
−γ
1− γ =
1
1− γ
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtβn,γ(tpx)1/γ dt
)γ
by (5) and (11).
Consider instead the utility UAγ provided by the annuity, namely
(17) UAγ =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
c1−γ0
1− γ dt =
∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
(1− γ)
( ∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
)1−γ = 11− γ(
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx dt
)γ
.
Theorem 18. UOTn,γ < U
A
γ for any n and γ > 0.
Proof. For γ 6= 1 this follows from Lemma 15 and the calculations given above. We show
the case γ = 1 in the appendix. 
3.3. Indifference Annuity Loading. The insurer offering an annuity will be modelled
as setting aside some fraction of the initial deposits to fund the annuity’s costs. In other
words, a fraction δ of the initial deposits are deducted initially, to fund risk management,
capital reserves, etc. The balance, invested at the risk free rate r will fund the annuity.
Therefore, with loading, (1) becomes that
∫∞
0
e−rttpx c(t) dt = 1 − δ, which implies that
c(t) ≡ c1 = (1 − δ)c0 is the optimal payout structure for the annuity. The utility of the
loaded annuity is therefore
ULAγ,δ =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
c1−γ1
1− γ dt =
(1− δ)1−γ ∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
(1− γ)
( ∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
)1−γ = c−γ01− γ (1− δ)1−γ
for γ 6= 1, and log(c0)+log(1−δ)
c0
for γ = 1.
In section 4 we will consider the indifference loading δ that, when applied to the annuity,
makes an individual indifferent between the annuity and a tontine, ie ULAγ,δ = U
OT
n,γ . It turns
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out that the loading δ decreases with n, in such a way that the total loading nδ stays roughly
stable. In other words, there is at most a fixed amount (roughly) the insurer can deduct
from the aggregate annuity pool, regardless of the number of participants, before individuals
start to derive greater utility from the tontine. We will illustrate this observation, at least
for 1 < γ ≤ 2, by proving the following inequality in the appendix
Theorem 19. Suppose that 1 < γ ≤ 2. Then δ < 1
n
(
c0
r
− 1).
Note that c0 > r, since c
−1
0 =
∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt <
∫∞
0
e−rt dt = r−1.
3.4. Subjective Mortality. Suppose now that there are two survival functions, an objec-
tive one tpx for the general population, and a subjective one tp˜x for the individual in question.
From an economic perspective, this is equivalent to having a subjective discount rate which
differs from the risk free rate r. Naturally the individual would prefer an annuity with a
different payout structure, because the Euler-Lagrange equations (3) become:
(20) e−rttp˜x u′(c(t)) = λe−rttpx for every t.
In other words, the optimal annuity structure, under CRRA utility, is
(21) cS(t) = cS(0)
(
tp˜x
tpx
)1/γ
.
So a healthier-than-normal individual (tp˜x > tpx) will prefer back-loading the annuity stream.
In essence, the mortality outlier finds annuity payments underpriced when they occur late
in life, so would prefer to invest in an annuity that enhances those payments. Of course,
this individual is going to be out of luck - annuities will be designed around the population’s
mortality, not theirs. But, this does raise a question about how one would test the extent to
which individuals believe themselves to be healthier than the population: if different annuity
structures are available, people who believe themselves to be healthier than the average
annuity purchaser should signal that belief by choosing back-loaded annuity payouts.
We can look at tontines in the same way (and test whether tontines might act as a proxy for
back-loaded annuities). If p˜ and p denote the subjective and objective survival probabilities,
then Euler-Lagrange for CRRA utility is that the optimal payout rate Dn,γ(p, p˜) satisfies
(22) p˜Dn,γ(p, p˜)
−γθn,γ(p) = λ.
In other words, if βn,γ(p, p˜) = p˜θn,γ(p) then
(23) Dn,γ(p, p˜) = Dn,γ(1, 1)βn,γ(p, p˜)
1/γ,
where the specific mortality model again enters only via
(24) Dn,γ(1, 1) =
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtβn,γ(tpx, tp˜x)1/γ dt
]−1
.
What this also implies is that a tontine provides relatively more utility if the (participant)
believes that the objective population survival rate is much lower the his or her individual
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survival rate. This, again, might explain the fact that some participants select the tontine
– perhaps they believe they are much healthier than the rest of the investment pool – while
some select the annuity. In ongoing work, we are attempting to quantify this effect.
3.5. Items Ignored. There are two issues we have not had a chance to address, which we
leave for possible future research, and that is the role of credit risk as well as the impact of
stochastic mortality. The existence of credit risk is a much greater concern for the buyers
of life annuities, vs. tontines, given the risk taken on by the insurance sponsor. Likewise,
under a stochastic mortality model the tontine payout would be more variable and uncertain,
which might further reduce the utility of the tontine relative to the life annuity. We leave
this for further investigation and focus now on the implications of our (simpler) model.
4. Numerics and Examples
4.1. King William’s tontine of 1639. We start by displaying some basic simulation re-
sults and summary statistics for the actuarial present value (APV) of cash-flow from a tontine
vs. a life annuity. In particular, we compute and display the actuarial (mortality adjusted)
mean, standard deviation and skewness of the discounted cash-flows. The mechanics of the
simulation itself are reported in the appendix and the parameter values we use coincide with
the tontine and annuity payout rates described in section 2. This is the easiest and most
transparent way to compare the economic value of the tontine to the annuity. From this it
is quite clear that the 14% annuity was offering more – in expected present value terms –
compared to the 10% / 7% tontine.
Table 4 and Table 5 go here
For example, under a 6% interest rate and (Gompertz smoothed) mortality rates the
actuarial present value (APV) of a tontine paying 10% for seven years and 7% thereafter,
for an x = 10 year-old nominee is approximately £133. This is a 33% premium to the £100
cost. This assumes a mortality basis as reported by Finlaison (1829). If we assume a higher
mortality rate, with a modal value of life m = 50, then the APV of the tontine is (an even
lower) at £130, albeit with a much higher skewness of 11.16.
Ceteris paribus, at higher ages, higher interest rates, or more aggressive mortality as-
sumptions, the APV is lower. Notice that the skewness is (positive) and higher under
more aggressive mortality assumption, namely when the force of mortality (proxied by m) is
higher. In contrast to the tontine, under the same 6% interest rate assumption the actuarial
present value (APV) of a life annuity paying 14% to an x = 10 year-old nominee is equal to
approximately £185. This is consistent with Halley’s (1694) claim that the 14% life annuity
was worth almost 14 years purchase at age ten. Notice also that the skewness for the life
annuity is always negative. So, for those investors who might value skewness (all else being
equal) the tontine might be preferred to a life annuity, although the present value is clearly
lower.
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4.2. Optimal Tontine in the 21st Century. Figure 3 displays the range of possible 4%
tontine dividends over time, assuming an initial pool of n = 400 nominees, under a Gompertz
law of mortality with parameters m = 88.721 and b = 10. This mortality basis corresponds
to a survival probability of 35p65 = 0.05, i.e. from age 65 to age 100 and is the baseline values
for several of our numerical examples. The figure clearly shows an increasing payment stream
conditional on survival, which isn’t the optimal function.
Indeed, in such a (traditional, historical) tontine scheme, the initial expected payment is
quite low, relative to what a life annuity might offer in the early years of retirement, while
the payment in the final years – for those fortunate enough to survive – would be very high
and quite variable. It is not surprising then that this form of tontine is both suboptimal
from an economic utility point of view and isn’t very appealing to individuals who want to
maximize their standard of living over their entire retirement years.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 go here
In contrast to Figure 3 which are the sub-optimal tontine, Figure 4 displays the range
of outcomes from the optimal tontine payout function, under the same interest rate and
mortality basis. To be very specific, Figure 4 is computed by solving for the value of DOTn,γ (1)
and then constructing DOTn,γ (tpx) for n = 400, r = 0.04 and γ = 1. Once the payout function
is known for all t, the number of survivors at the 10th and 90th percentile of the Binomial
distribution is used to bracket the range of the payout from age 65 to age 100. Clearly, the
expected payout per survivor is relatively constant over the retirement years, which is much
more appealing intuitively. Moreover, the discounted expected utility from a tontine payout
such as the one displayed in Figure 4 is much higher than the utility of the one displayed in
Figure 3.
Table 6 goes here
Table 6 displays the optimal tontine payout function for a very small pool of size N = 25.
These correspond to the DOTn,γ (tpx) values derived in section 3. Notice how the optimal
tontine payout function is quite similar (identical in the first significant digit) regardless of
the individual’s Longevity Risk Aversion γ, even when the tontine pool is relatively small at
n = 25. The minimum guaranteed dividend starts-off at about 7% at age 65 and then declines
to approximately 1% at age 95. Of course, the actual cash-flow payout to an individual,
conditional on being alive does not necessarily decline and actually stays relatively constant.
Table 7 goes here
Table 7 displays the utility indifference values for a participant at age 60. Notice how even
a retiree with a very high level of Longevity Risk Aversion (LoRA) γ, will select a tontine
(with pool size n ≥ 20) instead of a life annuity if the insurance loading is greater than 7.5%
Table 8 goes here
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Finally, 8 computes the certainty equivalent factors. If an individual with LoRA γ 6= 1
is faced with a tontine structure that is only (optimal) for someone with LoRA γ = 1 (i.e.
logarithmic utility) the welfare loss is minuscule. This is why we advocate the natural tontine
payout function, which is only optimal for γ = 1, as the basis for 21st century tontines.
Figure 5 goes here
Figure 5 shows the difference between the optimal tontine payout function for different
levels of Longevity Risk Aversion γ is barely noticeable when the tontine pool size is greater
than N = 250, mainly due to the effect of the law of large numbers. This curve traces the
minimum dividend that a survivor can expect to receive at various ages. The median is
(obviously) much higher.
Figure 6 goes here
Figure 6 illustrates the optimal tontine payout function for someone with logarithmic
γ = 1 utility starts-of paying the exact same rate as a life annuity regardless of the number
of participants in the tontine pool. But, for higher levels of longevity risk aversion γ and
a relatively smaller tontine pool, the function starts-off at a lower value and declines at a
slower rate
Figure 7 goes here
Figure 7 show that for a relatively smaller tontine pool size, the retiree who is highly
averse to longevity risk γ = 25 will want a guaranteed minimum payout rate (GMPR) at
advanced ages that is higher than his or her projected survival probability. In exchange they
will accept lower GMPR at lower ages. In contrast, the logarithmic utility maximizer will
select a GMPR that is exactly equal to the projected survival probability
Figure 8 goes here
Figure 8 indicates than an actuarially fair life annuity that guarantees 7.5% for life starting
at age 65 provides more utility than an optimal tontine regardless of Longevity Risk Aversion
(LoRA) or the size of the tontine pool. But, once an insurance loading is included, driving
the yield under the initial payout from the optimal tontine, the utility of the life annuity
might be lower. The indifference loading is δ and reported in table 7.
So here is our main takeaway and idea in the paper, once again. The historical tontine
in which dividends to the entire pool are a constant (e.g. 4%) interest rate over the entire
retirement horizon are suboptimal because they create an increasing consumption profile
that is both variable and undesirable. However, a tontine scheme in which interest payments
to the pool early-on are higher (e.g. 8%) and then decline over time, so that the few
winning centenarians receive a much lower interest rate (e.g. 1%) is in fact the optimal
policy. Coincidently, King William’s 1693 tontine had a similar declining structure of interest
payments to the pool, which was quite rare historically.
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We are careful to distinguish between the guaranteed interest rate (e.g. 8% or 1%) paid to
the entire pool, and the expected dividend to the individual investor in the optimal tontine,
which will be relatively constant over time, as is evident from Figure 3. Of course, the
present value of the interest paid to the entire pool over time is exactly equal to the original
contribution made by the pool itself. We are simply re-arranging and parsing cash-flows of
identical present value, in a different manner over time.
We have also shown that the utility loss from a properly designed tontine scheme is
quite small when compared to an actuarially fair life annuity, which is the work-horse of
the pension economics and lifecycle literature. In fact, the utility of from a tontine might
actually be higher than the utility generated by a pure life annuity when the insurance
(commission, capital cost, etc.) loading exceeds 10%. This result should not negate or be
viewed as conflicting with the wide-ranging annuity literature which proves the optimality
of life annuities in a lifecycle model. In fact, what we show is that it is still optimal to
fully hedge longevity risk, but the instrument that one uses to do so depends on the relative
costs. In other words, sharing longevity risk amongst a relatively small (n ≤ 100) pool
of people doesn’t create the large dis-utilities or welfare losses, at least within a classical
rational model. This can also be viewed as a further endorsement of the participating life
annuity, which lies in between the tontine and the conventional life annuity.
5. Brief Literature Review
This is not the place – not do we have the space – for a full review of the literature on
tontines, so we provide a selected list of key articles for those interested in further reading.
The original tontine proposal by Lorenzo Tonti appears in French in Tontine (1654) and
was translated and published in English in the wonderful collection of key historical actuarial
articles edited by Haberman and Sibbett (1995). The review article by Kopf (1927) and the
book by O’Donnell (1936) are quite dated, but do a wonderful job of documenting how
the historical tontine operated, discussing its checkered history, and providing a readable
biography of some of its earliest promoters in Denmark, Holland, France and England.
The monograph by Cooper (1972) is devoted entirely to tontines and the foundations of
the 19th century (U.S.) tontine insurance industry, which is based on the tontine concept
but is somewhat different because of the savings and lapsation component. In a widely
cited article, Ransom and Sutch (1987) provide the background and story of the banning of
tontine insurance in New York State, and then eventually the entire U.S. The comprehensive
monograph by Jennings and Trout (1982) reviews the history of tontines, with particular
emphasis on the French period, while carefully documenting payout rates and yields from
most known tontines. It is a minor classic in the field and is a primary source for anyone
interested in tontines.
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For those interested in the pricing of mortality-contingent claims during the 17th and
18th century, as well as the history and background of the people involved, we recommend
Alter (1983, 1986), Poitras (2000), Hald (2003), Poterba (2005), Ciecka (2008a, 2008b),
Rothschild (2009) as well as Bellhouse (2011), and of course, Homer and Sylla (2005) for
the relevant interest rates. Another important reference within the history of mortality-
contingent claim pricing is Finlaison (1829) who was the first to document the mortality
experience of King William’s 1693 tontine participants and argued that life annuities sold
by the British government – at the same price for all ages! – were severely underpriced.
More recently, the newspaper article by Chancellor (2001), the book by Lewin (2003) and
especially the recent review by McKeever (2009) all provide a very good history of tontines
and discuss the possibility of a tontine revival. The standard actuarial textbooks, such as
Promislow (2011) or Pitacco, et. al. (2009) for example, have a few pages devoted to the
historical tontine principal. More relevantly, a series of papers on pooled annuity funds,
for example Piggot, Valdez and Detzel (2005) have attempted to reintroduce tontine-like
structures. The closest paper we can find related to our natural tontine payout function is
the work by Sabin (2010) on a fair annuity tontine, as well as the recent paper by Donnelly,
Guillen and Nielsen (2013) which derives an expression for the amount individual are willing
to pay to avoid incurring longevity risk.
In sum, although the published research on tontine schemes is scattered across the insur-
ance, actuarial, economic, and history journals, we have come across few, if any, scholarly
articles that condemn or dismiss the tontine concept outright.
6. Conclusion and Relevance
It is not widely known that in the year 1790, the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
Alexander Hamilton proposed what some have called the nation’s first (financial) Hunger
Game. To help reduce a crushing national debt – something that is clearly not a recent
phenomenon – he suggested the U.S. government replace high-interest revolutionary war
debt with new bonds in which coupon payments would be made to a group as opposed
to individuals17. The group members would share the interest payments evenly amongst
themselves, provided they were alive. But, once a member of the group died, his or her
portion would stay in a pool and be shared amongst the survivors. This process would
theoretically continue until the very last survivor would be entitled to the entire – potentially
millions of dollars – interest payment. This obscure episode in U.S. history has become known
as Hamilton’s Tontine Proposal, which he claimed – in a letter to George Washington – would
reduce the interest paid on U.S. debt, and eventually eliminate it entirely.
17Source: Jennings, Swanson and Trout (1988)
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Although Congress decided to pass on Hamilton’s proposal (Hamilton left public life in
disgrace after admitting to an affair with a married woman, and soon-after died in duel with
the U.S. vice president at the time Aaron Burr) the tontine idea never died.
U.S. insurance companies began issuing tontine insurance policies – which are close cousins
to Tonti’s tontine – to the public in the mid-19th century, which became wildly popular18. By
the start of the 20th century, historians have documented that half of U.S. households owned
a tontine insurance policy, which many used to support themselves through retirement. The
longer one lived, the greater their payments. This was a personal hedge against longevity,
with little risk exposure for the insurance company. Sadly though, due to shenanigans and
malfeasance on the part of company executives, the influential New York State Insurance
Commission banned tontine insurance in the state, and by 1910 most other states followed.
Tontines have been illegal in the U.S. for over a century and most insurance executives have
likely never heard of them.
In sum, tontines not-only have a fascinating history but are actually based on sound
economic principles, In fact, Adam Smith himself, quoted at the beginning of this paper,
noted that tontines are preferred to life annuities. We believe that a strong case can be made
for overturning the current ban on tontine insurance – allowing both tontine and annuities
to co-exist as they did 320 years ago – with suitable adjustments to alleviate problems
encountered in the early 20th century. Indeed, given the insurance industry’s concern for
longevity risk capacity, and its poor experience in managing the risk of long-dated fixed
guarantees, one can argue that an (optimal) tontine annuity is a triple win proposition for
individuals, corporations and governments.
It is worth noting that under the proposed (EU) Solvency II guidelines for insurer’s capital
as well as risk-management, there is a renewed focus on total balance sheet risks. In particular,
insurers will be required to hold more capital against market risk, credit risk and operational
risk. In fact, in a recently released report by Moody’s Investor Services19, they claim that
solvency ratios will exhibit a more complex volatility under Solvency II than under Solvency I,
as both the available capital and the capital requirements will change with market conditions.
According to many commentators this is likely to translate into higher consumer prices
for insurance products with long-term maturities and guarantees. And, although this only
applies to European companies (at this point time), it is not unreasonable to conclude that
in a global market annuity loadings will increase, making (participating) tontine products
relatively more appealing to price-sensitive consumers.
Moreover, perhaps a properly designed tontine product could help alleviate the low levels
of voluntary annuity purchases – a.k.a. the annuity puzzle – by gaming the behavioral biases
and prejudices exhibited by retirees. The behavioral economics literature and advocates of
18Source: Ransom and Sutch (1987)
19Source: European Insurers: Solvency II - Volatility of Regulatory Ratios Could Have Broad Implications
For European Insurers, May 2013, available on www.moodys.com
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cumulative prospect theory have argued that consumers make decisions based on more gen-
eral value functions with personalized decisions weights. Among other testable hypotheses,
this leads to a preference for investments with (highly) skewed outcomes, even when the
alternative is a product with the same expected present values20. Our simulations indicate
that the skewness (third moment) of tontine payouts is positive and higher than the skew-
ness of a life annuity, especially if purchased at older ages. We believe this is yet another
argument in favor of re-introducing tontines. Of course, whether the public and regulators
can be convinced of these benefits remains to be seen, but a debate would be informative.
We are not alone in this quest. Indeed, during the last decade a number of companies
around the world – egged on by scholars and journalists21 – have tried to resuscitate the
tontine concept (with patents pending of course) while trying to avoid the bans and taints.
Although the specific designs differ from proposal to proposal, all share the same idea we
described in this paper: Companies act as custodians and guarantee very little. This ar-
rangement requires less capital which then translates into more affordable pricing for the
consumer. Once again our models indicate that a properly designed tontine could hold its
own against an actuarially fair life annuity and pose a real challenge to a loaded annuity.
We suspect that the biggest obstacle to bringing back tontines is the name itself and
the image it evokes. Might we conclude by suggesting the weightier Hamiltonian as an
alternative? Each share would be offered for a modest $10 investment.
20Source: Barberis (2013)
21See for example: Chancellor (2001), Goldsticker (2007), Pechter (2007), Chung and Tett (2007), as well
as the more scholarly articles by Richter and Weber (2011), Rotemberg (2009) and especially Sabin’s (2010)
Fair Tontine Annuity.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Proofs. To simplify notation, we write θ(p) = θn,γ(p), β(p) = βn,γ(p), and D(p) =
DOTn,γ (p).
Proof of Lemma 15. The case γ = 1 is trivial. For 2 ≤ γ there is a simple proof, since
θ(p) = E
[(N(p)
n
)γ−1]
≥ E
[N(p)
n
]γ−1
=
(1 + (n− 1)p
n
)γ−1
=
(
p+
1− p
n
)γ−1
> pγ−1
by Jensen, implying β(p) = pθ(p) > pγ. To prove the general case γ > 0 requires a more
involved argument, based on the following calculation:
Lemma 25. E[ n
N(p)
] < 1
p
.
Proof.
E
[ n
N(p)
]
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k n
k + 1
=
1
p
n−1∑
k=0
(
n
k + 1
)
pk+1(1− p)n−(k+1) = 1
p
[1− (1− p)n] < 1
p
.

Suppose first that 0 < γ < 1. Ho¨lder’s inequality implies that E[( n
N(p)
)a]1/a is increasing
in a > 0. In particular, whenever 0 < a < 1, we have
(26) E
[( n
N(p)
)a]1/a
< E
[ n
N(p)
]
<
1
p
,
by Lemma 25. Taking a = 1 − γ, we obtain that θ(p) < (1
p
)1−γ = pγ−1. Therefore β(p) =
pθ(p) < pγ as required.
Now suppose γ > 1. Set A = lima↓0E[( nN(p))
a]1/a < 1
p
by (26). By l’Hoˆpital’s rule,
A = elima↓0
1
a
logE[( n
N(p)
)a] = elima↓0 E[(
n
N(p)
)a log( n
N(p)
)]/E[( n
N(p)
)a] = e−E[log(
N(p)
n
)].
Taking log’s, we obtain that
(27) E
[
log
(N(p)
n
)]
> log p.
As above, E[(N(p)
n
)a]1/a is increasing in a > 0, so by (27) and the same l’Hoˆpital argument
as before,
E
[(N(p)
n
)γ−1] 1
γ−1
> lim
a↓0
E
[(N(p)
n
)a]1/a
= eE[log(
N(p)
n
)] > elog p = p.
Therefore θ(p) > pγ−1, so β(p) = pθ(p) > pγ, proving Lemma 15. 
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Proof of Theorem 18. The case γ 6= 1 follows immediately from Lemma 15. When γ = 1, we
have u(c) = log c so UOTn,1 =
∫∞
0
e−rttpxE[log(
nc0 tpx
N(tpx)
)] dt, while UA1 =
∫∞
0
e−rttpx log(c0) dt.
Therefore
UA1 − UOTn,1 =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
(
E
[
log
(N(tpx)
n
)]− log(tpx)) dt,
and the result now follows by (27).

7.2. Indifference loading.
Proof of Theorem 19. Since 1 < γ ≤ 2, cγ−1 is concave in c, so lies below its tangents.
Therefore
θ(p) = E
[(N(p)
n
)γ−1]
≤ E
[
pγ−1 + (γ − 1)pγ−2
(N
n
− p
)]
= pγ−1 + (γ − 1)pγ−21− p
n
.
c1/γ is also strictly concave in c, so in the same way
β(p)
1
γ = (pθ(p))
1
γ < (pγ)
1
γ +
1
γ
(pγ)
1
γ
−1 · (γ − 1)pγ−11− p
n
= p+
(γ − 1)(1− p)
γn
.
Therefore ∫ ∞
0
e−rtβ(tpx)
1
γ dt <
1
c0
+
γ − 1
γn
(1
r
− 1
c0
)
.
By definition,
c−γ0
1− γ (1− δ)
1−γ =
1
1− γ
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtβ(tpx)1/γ, dt
)γ
,
and 1− c γ1−γ is also concave in c, so as before
δ = 1−
(
c0
∫ ∞
0
e−rtβ(tpx)
1
γ dt
) γ
1−γ · < − γ
1− γ ·
γ − 1
γn
(c0
r
− 1
)
=
1
n
(c0
r
− 1
)
as required. 
For any γ one can derive (using the second moment of N(p) now, as well as the first) the
asymptotic result that δn → γ
2
( co
r
− 1). But convergence turns out to be so slow that this
precise asymptotic is of limited use. (The slow convergence derives from the observation
that, with Gompertz mortality, the time t till tpx reaches
1
n
grows only at rate b log log n.)
For example, with γ = 2, r = 3%, age x = 50, and Gompertz parameters m = 87.25 and
b = 9.5, we obtain γ
2
( co
r
− 1) = 0.6593; But for n = 10, 100, or 1000 we only have δn =
0.2858, 0.3377, and 0.3671; In fact, even with n = 7× 109 tontine participants (roughly the
world’s entire population, all postulated to share the same age and hazard rate), we would
only reach δn = 0.4417
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7.3. Certainty Equivalents, and the Natural Tontine. We wish to compare the welfare
loss experienced by an individual with longevity risk aversion γ 6= 1, if they participate in a
natural tontine rather than an optimal one. We therefore calculate the ratio Γ ≥ 1 of the
certainty equivalents of the two tontines. This represents the initial deposit into a natural
tontine needed to provide the same utility as a $1 deposit into an optimal one. The natural
tontine has utility
UNn,γ =
c1−γ0
1− γ
∫ ∞
0
e−rttp2−γx θn,γ(tpx) dt.
Therefore
Γ =
[
UOTn,γ
UNn,γ
] 1
1−γ
=
[
DOTn,γ (1)
−γ
c1−γ0
∫∞
0
e−rttp
2−γ
x θn,γ(tpx) dt
] 1
1−γ
which is then leads to:
Γ =
( ∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
)( ∫∞
0
e−rtβn,γ(tpx)
1
γ dt)
γ
1−γ( ∫∞
0
e−rttp
2−γ
x θn,γ(tpx) dt
) 1
1−γ
.
When we compute these values numericaly, for 0 < γ ≤ 2, we get values quite close to 1.
Moreover, if we let n→∞, then βn,γ(p)1/γ → p and θn,γ(p)→ p−(1−γ), which makes Γ→ 1
asymptotically, as long as γ ≤ 2.
For γ > 2 this is not a fair comparison, as the integral diverges and UNn,γ =∞. It is worth
understanding why. For the optimal tontine, the integrand involves [pθn,γ(p)]
1/γ ∼ p 1γn 1−γγ
ie. is well behaved as p→ 0. On the other hand, the integral for the natural tontine involves
p2−γθn,γ(p) which can be large when p→ 0 if γ > 2. This means that for γ > 2 the natural
tontine utility is unduly influenced by the possibility of living to highly advanced ages. Even
if there is only a single survivor, that survivor’s payout will have dropped to quite low levels
by the time it is actually improbable that anyone will live that long. And for γ > 2 the
negative consequences of the low payout dominate the small probability of surviving that
long.
7.4. Description of Tontine Simulation. We start with a pool of n = 1000 (for example)
homogenous individuals who assume the role of both the annuitant and nominee, each of
age x with maximum lifespan ω = 105, at which point everyone is dead. These n individuals
contribute £w to the tontine pool for a total of £wn. We use the symbol triplet L(x, i, t)
to denote the life state of the ith individual in year t = ω − x. Formally, L(x, i, t) = 1 while
the ith nominee is still alive and L(x, i, t) = 0 once the nominee is dead. We start with
L(x, i, 0) = 1. The next value of L(x, i, t) is obtained by simulating a standard uniform [0,1]
killing random variable u, and then setting the variable L(x, i, t) = 0 whenever u < qx+t
where qx+t is the mortality rate applicable at age (x + t). So, for example, if the mortality
rate at age 30 is q30 = 0.15, and the random variable outcome for u = 0.2, then the individual
survives. But, if u = 0.1, the individual is killed and all future L(x, i, t) values are set to
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zero. (No resurrections allowed!) Obviously, the greater the value of qx+t, the higher the
probability (and realization) of death. This might not be the most efficient or fastest way
to simulate the matrix of lifespans, but it’s the easiest to explain.
In sum, for each simulation run denoted by j, this process generates a (big) matrix L(j)
with n rows and (ω − x + 1) columns. The first row is set to be all ones – everyone starts
alive – and all rows slowly decay to zeros over time. Finally, the last column is (forced) to
be all zeros. We set the baseline to be M = 10,000 simulations so that: 1 ≤ j ≤ 10000, and
the initial age will be x = 10, which was the average age of the nominees in King William’s
tontine of 1693.
At the end of each year a total of £wnd(t) is distributed as a dividend to the survivors,
where d(t) denotes the value of the tontine payout function at time t. For the 1693 tontine
for example, d(t) = 10% for the first 7 years (to the year 1700), and then d(t) = 7%
thereafter. This then generates a new matrix D(x, i, t) which denotes the cash dividend to
the ith individual in the tth year. Note that D(x, i, t) = 0, whenever L(x, i, t) = 0. Dead
people share no dividends. The process of computing D(x, i, t) is rather simple, assuming
nominee (x, i) is alive in time period t. Namely, divide wnd(t) which is the total interest
payable to the surviving pool members, by the number of people alive, which is sum of
L(x, i, t) from i = 1 to i = n. Formally it is:
D(x, i, t) =
wnd(t)∑N
i=1 L(x, i, t)
Now, the main quantity we interested in computing is the variable PV (x, i, j), which is
the present value of the tontine payout to nominee (x, i), in simulation run number j ≤M .
Formally it is defined as:
PV (x, i, j) =
ω−x∑
t=1
D(x, i, t)
(1 +R)t
where R is the valuation rate (assumed to be 6% for most cases). Algorithmically, the
entire numerator vector is simulated – first, based on the number of other survivors – and
then discounted to arrive at a present value for the tontine payoff to nominee (x, i), in
one particular simulation run. Notice that once L(x, i, t) is zero (the nominee is dead), then
D(x, i, t) is zero as well so the entire summation is valid. Every simulation run j, will generate
a value for PV (x, i, j) for a total of M = 10, 000 present values for a given representative
nominee (x, i).
Finally, we are interested in the sample mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis
of these M = 10, 000 (simulated) present values. For further clarity of notation, note that
the (simulation) sample mean, which is an actuarial present value, is defined as:
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APV (x, i) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
PV (x, i, j)
The (simulation) sample standard deviation is:
SDPV (x, i) =
√
1
M
∑
(PV (x, i, j)− APV (x, i))2
The sample skewness and kurtosis is defined in a similar manner.
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King William’s Tontine of 1693
# of Nominees # of Shares Average Age at Nomination
Males 604 653 10.85
Females 409 428 10.98
Total 1,013 1,081 10.90
Source: Raw data from Howard (1694). Compiled by The IFID Centre
Table 1. 1,013 nominees remained in the tontine, after the annuity conversion
option expired. There was a single share class, paying a guaranteed dividend
of £10 (semiannually) until June 1700 and then £7 thereafter, until seven
nominees remained. Surprisingly, over 60% of the nominees were male, while
the last nominee (a female) died at the age of 100 in the year 1783 after
receiving a tontine dividend of £1,081.
King William’s Tontine of 1693
# of Nominees Shares Purchased Total Shares
956 1 956
51 2 102
3 3 9
1 4 4
2 5 10
1,013 1,081
Source: Raw data from Howard (1694). Compiled by The IFID Centre
Table 2. The gap between the number of nominees (1013) and the number
of tontine shares (1081) has caused some confusion over the years. Various
sources have reported different values for the size of the original tontine pool.
It is also worth noting that the average age of nominees with multiple shares
(13.7 years) was higher than the average age of one-share nominees (10.7 years)
by three years. So in fact, nominees with multiple shares contingent on their
life died earlier (on average.)
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King William’s Tontine of 1693
Age Number of Nominees Alive in 1730 Alive in 1749
0-2 99 = 50m + 49f 58 = 25m + 30f 34 = 20m + 14f
3-5 183 = 108m + 75f 105 = 60m + 45f 60 = 36m + 24f
6-8 174 = 111m + 63f 93 = 53m + 40f 53 = 30m + 23f
9-11 181 = 102m + 79f 100 = 48m + 52f 52 = 25m + 27f
12-14 138 = 82m + 56f 63 = 34m + 29f 35 = 17m + 18f
15-17 69 = 37m + 32f 31 = 16m + 15f 14 = 4m + 10f
18-20 50 = 25m + 25f 22 = 11m + 11f 7 = 3m + 4f
21-23 41 = 27m + 14f 17 = 9m + 8f 7 = 3m + 4f
24-26 22 = 14m + 8f 10 = 6m + 4f 5 = 3m + 2f
27-29 14 = 8m + 6f 3 = 3m + 0f 0
30-32 16 = 10m + 6f 6 = 4m + 2f 0
33-35 7 = 5m + 2f 3 = 1m + 2f 0
36-38 7 = 4m + 3f 1 = 1m + 0f 0
39-41 6 = 4m + 2f 2 = 1m + 1f 0
42-44 1 = 1m + 0f 0 0
45-47 3 = 3m + 0f 0 0
48-50 1 = 0m + 1f 0 0
51-53 1 = 0m + 1f 0 0
Avg. Age 11.10 9.83 (46.83) 8.59 (64.59)
Total: 1013 514 267
Source: Raw data from Howard (1694), Anonymous (1730) & Anonymous (1749)
Table 3. While it is quite natural that more infants weren’t nominated, given
high child mortality rates in the first few years of life, it is rather puzzling that
so many tontine nominees were of such advanced ages. In fact, by the year
1749 none of the original nominees above the age of 26 were still alive.
OPTIMAL RETIREMENT TONTINES 33
King William’s Tontine of 1693: Simulated Results at Age 10 per £100
Interest Mortality Basis: GoMa. APV SDev. PV Skew. PV
4% l = 0.0104,m = 69.5, b = 13.8 £186.54 £96.05 4.06
4% l = 0,m = 50, b = 10 £174.91 £96.98 13.18
6% l = 0.0104,m = 69.5, b = 13.8 £133.02 £45.74 -0.46
6% l = 0,m = 50, b = 10 £130.31 £48.5 11.16
8% l = 0.0104,m = 69.5, b = 13.8 £103.15 £28.88 -1.73
8% l = 0,m = 50, b = 10 £102.10 £21.41 2.42
Notes: Based on simulation assumptions described in the appendix.
Table 4. Under a 6% interest rate and (Gompertz Makeham smoothed) mor-
tality rates as reported in Finlaison (1829), the actuarial present value (APV)
of a tontine paying 10% for seven years and 7% thereafter, for an x = 10
year-old nominee is approximately £133. This is a 33% premium to the cost.
At ages higher than x = 10, higher interest rates or more aggressive mortality
assumption, the APV is lower.
Life Annuity Paying 14% Income: Simulated Results at Age 10 per £100
Interest Mortality Basis: GoMa. APV SDev. of APV Skew. of APV
4% l = 0.0104,m = 69.5, b = 13.8 £244.05 £87.07 -1.19
4% l = 0,m = 50, b = 10 £245.16 £54.24 -1.73
6% l = 0.0104,m = 69.5, b = 13.8 £184.53 £57.88 -1.60
6% l = 0,m = 50, b = 10 £191.13 £35.44 -2.44
8% l = 0.0104,m = 69.5, b = 13.8 £147.55 £41.17 -1.99
8% l = 0,m = 50, b = 10 £155.38 £23.19 -3.19
Notes: Based on simulation assumptions described in the appendix
Table 5. Under a 6% interest rate and (Gompertz Makeham smoothed) mor-
tality rates as reported in Finlaison (1829), the actuarial present value (APV)
of a life annuity paying 14% to an x = 10 year-old nominee is worth approx-
imately £185. This is consistent with Halley’s (1694) claim that the 14% life
annuity was worth almost 14 years purchase at age ten.
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Optimal Tontine Payout Function: Pool of Size n = 25
LoRA (γ) Payout Age 65 Payout Age 80 Payout Age 95
0.5 7.565% 5.446% 1.200%
1.0 7.520% 5.435% 1.268%
1.5 7.482% 5.428% 1.324%
2.0 7.447% 5.423% 1.374%
4.0 7.324% 5.410% 1.541%
9.0 7.081% 5.394% 1.847%
Survival 0p65 =100% 15p65 =72.2% 30p65 =16.8%
Notes: Assumes r = 4% and Gompertz Mortality (m = 88.72, b = 10)
Table 6. Notice how the optimal tontine payout function DOTn,γ (tpx) is quite
similar (identical in the first significant digit) regardless of the individual’s
Longevity Risk Aversion γ, even when the tontine pool is relatively small at
n = 25. The minimum guaranteed dividend starts-off at about 7% at age 65
and then declines to approximately 1% at age 95. Of course, the actual cash-
flow received by a survivor does not necessarily decline and stays relatively
constant.
The Highest Annuity Loading δ You Are Willing to Pay
If a Tontine Pool of Size n is Available
LoRA γ n = 20 n = 100 n = 500 n = 1000 n = 5000
0.5 72.6 b.p. 14.5 b.p. 2.97 b.p. 1.50 b.p. 0.30 b.p.
1.0 129.8 b.p. 27.4 b.p. 5.74 b.p. 2.92 b.p. 0.60 b.p.
1.5 182.4 b.p. 39.8 b.p. 8.45 b.p. 4.31 b.p. 0.89 b.p.
2.0 231.7 b.p. 51.8 b.p. 11.1 b.p. 5.68 b.p. 1.18 b.p.
3.0 323.1 b.p. 75.1 b.p. 16.3 b.p. 8.38 b.p. 1.75 b.p.
9.0 753.6 b.p. 199.8 b.p. 45.9 b.p. 23.8 b.p. 5.09 b.p.
Assumes Age x = 60, r = 3% and Gompertz Mortality (m = 87.25, b = 9.5)
Table 7. Even a retiree with a very high level of Longevity Risk Aversion
(LoRA) γ = 9, will select a tontine (with pool size n ≥ 20) instead of a life
annuity if the insurance loading is greater than 7.5%; Optimal tontine’s aren’t
so bad!
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Natural vs. Optimal Tontine
Certainty Equivalent for n = 100
Age x γ = 0.5 γ = 1 γ = 2
30 1.000018 1 1.000215
40 1.000026 1 1.000753
50 1.000041 1 1.001674
60 1.000067 1 1.003388
70 1.000118 1 1.003451
80 1.000225 1 1.009877
r = 3% and Gompertz m = 87.25, b = 9.5
Table 8. If an individual with LoRA γ 6= 1 is faced with a tontine structure
that is only (optimal) for someone with LoRA γ = 1 (i.e. logarithmic utility)
the welfare loss is minuscule. This is why we advocate the natural tontine
payout function, which is only optimal for γ = 1 as the basis for 21st century
tontines.
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King	  William's	  Ton1ne:	  Survival	  Projec1ons	  per	  10,000	  Par1cipants	  
Ini1al	  Projec1on	  1692	  
Revised	  Projec1on	  1693	  
Actual	  Survival	  Rate	  
Figure 1. The initial projections made by the promoters of the tontine in
late 1692 were too optimistic. The revised projections made in mid-1693 were
wildly optimistic. In fact, the 70% survival rate observed by the year 1718
led to accusations of fraud. No other data points are available. Data source:
Lewin (2003), Walford (1871). Compiled by The IFID Centre.
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Figure 2. Final verified tally of the annuitants (=investors), nominees and
number of shares purchased in King William’s tontine of 1693, as well as their
gender composition. Compiled by The IFID Centre based on the original
records printed in Howard (1694).
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Figure 3. The range of d0 = 4% tontine dividends during the first few
decades or retirement is relatively low and predictable for a pool size in the
hundreds. The dividends increase exponentially at later ages and the 80%
range is much wider as well. But this is not the only way to construct a tontine.
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Figure 4. The optimal tontine pays survivors a cash-value that is expected
to remain relatively constant over time, conditional on survival. Although
the 80% range of outcomes does increase at higher ages given the inherent
uncertainty in the number of survivors from an initial pool of n = 400. This
structure is optimal for logarithmic γ = 1 utility and nearly optimal for all
other levels of Longevity Risk Aversion.
40 M.A. MILEVSKY AND T.S. SALISBURY
0.000%	  
1.000%	  
2.000%	  
3.000%	  
4.000%	  
5.000%	  
6.000%	  
7.000%	  
8.000%	  
0	   2	   4	   6	   8	   10	   12	   14	   16	   18	   20	   22	   24	   26	   28	   30	   32	   34	   36	   38	   40	   42	   44	   46	   48	   50	  
Time	  (in	  Years)	  A9er	  Age	  65	  
Op=mal	  Ton=ne	  Payout	  Func=on:	  Gompertz	  Mortality	  
Age	  =	  65;	  n	  =	  250;	  Risk	  Free	  Rate	  =	  4%,	  m	  =	  88.721,	  b	  =	  10	  
gamma	  =10	   gamma	  =	  1.0	   Annuity	  Payout	   Perpetuity	   gamma	  =	  25	  
Figure 5. The difference between the optimal tontine payout function for
different levels of Longevity Risk Aversion γ is barely noticeable when the
tontine pool size is greater than N = 250, mainly due to the effect of the law
of large numbers. This curve traces the minimum dividend that a survivor
can expect to receive at various ages. The expected is (obviously) much higher.
OPTIMAL RETIREMENT TONTINES 41
0.000%	  
1.000%	  
2.000%	  
3.000%	  
4.000%	  
5.000%	  
6.000%	  
7.000%	  
8.000%	  
0	   2	   4	   6	   8	   10	   12	   14	   16	   18	   20	   22	   24	   26	   28	   30	   32	   34	   36	   38	   40	   42	   44	   46	   48	   50	  
Time	  (in	  Years)	  A9er	  Age	  65	  
Op=mal	  Ton=ne	  Payout	  Func=on:	  Gompertz	  Mortality	  
Age	  =	  65;	  n	  =	  25;	  Risk	  Free	  Rate	  =	  4%,	  m	  =	  88.721,	  b	  =	  10	  
gamma	  =10	   gamma	  =	  1.0	   Annuity	  Payout	   Perpetuity	   gamma	  =	  25	  
Figure 6. The optimal tontine payout function for someone with logarithmic
γ = 1 utility starts-of paying the exact same rate as a life annuity regardless
of the number of participants in the tontine pool. But, for higher levels of
longevity risk aversion γ and a relatively smaller tontine pool, the function
starts-off at a lower value and declines at a slower rate
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Figure 7. For a relatively smaller tontine pool size, the retiree who is highly
averse to longevity risk γ = 25 will want a guaranteed minimum payout rate
(GMPR) at advanced ages that is higher than his or her projected survival
probability. In exchange they will accept lower GMPR at lower ages. In
contrast, the logarithmic utility maximizer will select a GMPR that is exactly
equal to the projected survival probability.
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Figure 8. An actuarially fair life annuity that guarantees 7.5% for life start-
ing at age 65 provides more utility than an optimal tontine regardless of
Longevity Risk Aversion (LoRA) or the size of the tontine pool. But, once
an insurance loading is included, driving the yield under the initial payout
from the optimal tontine, the utility of the life annuity might be lower. The
indifference loading is δ and reported in table 7
